In this published version of the Terry lectures, delivered at Yale University last year, the novelist Marilynne Robinson argues that positivism, the belief that science is the only reliable means to truth, has adopted a “systematically reductionist” view of human nature.

From “Absence of Mind by Marilynne Robinson / Karen Armstrong hails a profound and timely argument against the positivist world view“, The Guardian, 3/7/2010.

So according to Karen Armstrong, positivism is “the belief that science is the only reliable means to truth.” This, of course, is neither true nor false, and the author -in making such an off-hand assertion – does not seem to care either way. By definition then, this is bullshit. (see “Frankfurt, Harry G. (2005). On Bullshit. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. ISBN 0-691-12294-6. — Harry Frankfurt’s detailed analysis of the concept of bullshit.”)

If you read the rest of the article, you should also check the comments, especially the one by “llewellyr” (4 Jul 2010, 4:18PM.)

The scientific popularizers—Richard Dawkins, Daniel Dennett, Steven Pinker, and others—don’t go in for nuance, as David Hart has pointed out again and again in our pages.

“Scientific popularizer”… is that a popularizer who is scientific? A popularizer of what exactly? Certainly not of science, as that would be a “science popularizer” or, for the sake of completeness (and at the risk of being verbose,) a “popularizer of science.” It is an awkward turn of phrase, one that must have been meant as derogatory. In any case, professors Dawkins, Dennett, and Pinker have certainly done their best to make science more popular and accessible. No one can fault them for that, but it is seems they are accused of lacking nuance. I, for one, think that is a good thing as I do not believe there is place for nuance in serious discourse. Reno seems to disagree, but then does he “go in” for nuance? One needs only to read that first sentence to answer that in the negative.

They cheerfully champion the most reductive sort of materialism, including the idea that free will does not exist because our minds are just neural networks that function according to physical laws.

I don’t see anything wrong with being cheerful, unless one overdoes it, but the sweeping statement that these three professors champion “the most reductive” sort of materialism is simply not true. There are more reductive materialisms than those to which these professors adhere. Also, it is simply not true that anyone of them thinks that a mind is “just” a neural network that functions according to physical laws. Although, to be fair, I am sure that whatever they think a mind is, they would all agree that it functions according to physical laws.

Why are they so enthusiastic about this idea that our minds are just neural networks? It’s not at first sight a very attractive belief. After all, free will provides a sense of self-possession, and it’s the source of the drama in life.

I do not know if professors Dawkins, Dennett, and Pinker are all that enthusiastic about it, but I am sure Reno is better informed about their demeanour than I am. What troubles me, though, is that he attaches importance to the attraction of beliefs.
Who cares if a belief is attractive? Are we supposed to believe what we like? This is a very, very important point – and one that keeps coming up in apologetic discourse. Well, no. Believing what you like instead of what is supported by compelling evidence is not only disingenuous, it is immoral as false beliefs lead to false judgements. But then, is it really possible to believe what you like if you know it is false? You give that a try.
Anyway, there is one last thing that is wrong with this paragraph: Reno implies that if free will is incompatible with the assertion that minds are just neural networks [that function according to physical laws.] Well, perhaps it is, though he does not bother explaining why this should be so.
No matter. According to Reno, if you do not like the idea that minds are neural networks governed by physical laws, you should not believe it. Well, believe what you will but it would be hubris to think that what you like or what you believe is of any importance. Believing in something does not make it so.
If you disagree, then please try to believe it is not raining when it is because the idea of getting wet is not attractive to you, and see how long you will stay dry without an umbrella.

As I said earlier, I have only commented on the first part. Here’s why: the rest of the article is postmodernist incoherent gobbledygook, so there is really no way to say anything interesting about it. That’s a shame. After all, Reno is a professor, and professors should be careful not to publish nonsense.

Credit goes to Stephen Fry for finding it on jezebel.

Here’s one of my favorite comments on jezebel:

I’d like to distill International Cunt Circus (Icc)and add it to Christ on a Fucking Bike(Cfb). I think I’d get a good reaction.

bertrand, n. (1) A state of profound abstraction of mind and spirit; a trance. “He went into a bertrand and began to babble about the class of all classes which are not member of themselves.” (2) The state of a person who suffers from delusions (e.g. as of one who doubts that, when he sees a table, he sees a table), or has visions (e.g. of the present King of France). (3) A state of linguistic amnesia, as of one who believes that “this” is a proper name and “Plato” a description.

from http://www.philosophicallexicon.com/

(Couldn’t resist this one either.)

wittgenstone (from Old High Anglo-Austrian, witty and Stein) (1) v. To deny resolutely the existence or importance of something real or significant, on the ground that the grammatical pre-conditions for such a denial do not obtain. “Some think qualia should be quined or fostered – but I think they should be wittgenstoned.” (2) n. Clever but utterly unrelated metaphor used as an argumentative move to silence the opponent. “He argued that on my view I don’t know that I’m in pain; but since he’s not a good kripkographer, I managed to outsmart him with a wittgenstone.”

from http://www.philosophicallexicon.com/